Abstract
Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a set of wireless mobile nodes can be connected dynamically in an arbitrary manner. All nodes of these networks behave as routers and take part in discovery and maintenance of routes to other nodes in the network. Many routing protocols have been proposed, but a few comparisons between them have been made [1] . Most of these routing protocols are cooperative in nature, and rely on implicit trust-your-neighbor relationships to route packets among participating nodes. This naïve trust model allows malicious nodes to paralyze an ad hoc network by inserting erroneous routing updates, replaying old routing information, changing routing updates, or advertising incorrect routing information [2] . While these attacks are possible in fixed networks as well, the nature of the ad hoc environment magnifies their effects, and makes their detection difficult [3] .
The characteristics of an ad hoc network demand new metrics for routing. Traditionally, distance (measured in hops) is used as the metric in most ad hoc route discovery (e.g., AODV [4] , DSR [5] , TORA [6] etc.
). The use of other metrics (e.g., geographic location [7] , signal stability [8] etc.) can improve the quality and the relevance of the routes discovered for particular applications and configurations. Along these lines, we explore the use of different security attributes the improve the quality of the security of an ad-hoc route.
In this paper, we proposed a new security aware routing (SADSR), an approach to routing that incorporates security levels of nodes into traditional routing metrics. Our goal is to characterize and explicitly represent the trust values and trust relationships associated with ad hoc nodes and use these values to make routing decisions.
In addition to determine the secure route, the information in the routing messages must also be protected against alteration that can change routing behavior.
In this paper, we analyze the security of ad hoc routing algorithms with respect to the protection associated with the transmission of routing messages. We identify the attributes of secure route and define appropriate metrics to quantity the "level of security" associated with protocol messages. These metrics are adapted from their equivalents in security of wired routing protocols [9] . This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the basic operation of DSR. We present SADSR protocol for secure route discovery in section 3. We describe our threat model, develop an attack classification and validate our protocol against this model in section 4 and section 5. Section 6 elaborates on the simulation environment and the experimental results comparing SADSR with DSR routing protocol.
DSR Protocol
DSR is an entirely on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol composed of two parts: Route Discovery and Route Maintenance. In this section, we describe the basic form of Route Discovery and Route maintenance in DSR.
In DSR, when a node has a packet to send to some destination and does not currently have a route to that destination in its Route Cache, the node initiates Route Discovery to find a route; this node is known as the initiator of the Route Discovery, and the destination of the packet is known as the Discovery's target. The initiator transmits a Route Request (RREQ) packet as a local broadcast, specifying the target and a unique identifier from the initiator. Each node receiving the Route Request, if it has recently seen this request identifier from the initiator, discards the Request. Otherwise, it appends its own node address to a list in the Request and rebroadcasts the Request. When the Route Request reaches its target node, the target sends a Route Replay (RREP) back to the initiator of the Request, including a copy of the accumulated list of addresses from the Request. When the Replay reaches the initiator of the Request, it caches the new route in its Route Cache.
Route Maintenance is the mechanism by which a node sending a packet along a specified route to some destination detects if that route has broken, for example because two nodes in it have moved too apart. DSR is based on source routing: when sending a packet, the originator lists in the header of the packet the complete sequence of nodes through which the packet is forwarded. Each node along the route forwards the packet to the next hop indicated in the packet's header, and attempts to confirm this by means of a link-layer acknowledgment or network layer acknowledgment. If, after a limited number of local retransmissions of the packet, a node in the route is unable to make this confirmation, it returns a Route Error to the original source of packet, identifying the link from itself to the next node was broken. The sender then removes this broken link from its Route Cache; for subsequent packets to its destination, the sender may use any other route to its destination in its Cash, or it may attempt a new Route Discovery for that target if necessary.
SADSR Routing
We present a general description of our protocol and its behavior and enumerate the metrics we deploy to measure the quality of security of an ad hoc route discovered by our protocol.
Protocol
We assume that the base protocol is a DSR protocol. In SADSR, we embed our security metric into RREQ packet itself, and change the forwarding behavior of the protocol with respect to RREQs. Intermediate nodes receive an RREQ packet with a particular security metric or trust level. SADSR ensures that this node can only process the packet or forward it if the node itself can provide the required security or has the required authorization or trust level. If the node cannot provide the required security, the RREQ is dropped. If an endto-end path with the required security attributes can be found, a suitably modified RREP is sent from an intermediate node or the eventual destination. SADSR can be implemented based on any on-demand ad-hoc routing protocol with suitable modification. In this paper, we use DSR as our platform to implement SADSR.
Behavior
Our modification to the traditional ad hoc routing protocol changes the nature of the routes discovered in an ad hoc network. The route discovered by SADSR between two communicating entities may not be the shortest route in terms of hop-count. However SADSR is able to find a route with a quantifiable guarantee of security. If one or more routes that satisfy the required security attributes exist, SADSR will find the shortest such route. If all the nodes on the shortest path (in terms of hop count) between two nodes can satisfy the security requirements, SADSR will find routes that are optimal. However, if the ad hoc network does not have a path with nodes that meet RREQ' s security requirements, SADSR may fail to find a route even if the network is connected.
Protocol Metrics
In this subsection, we enumerate different techniques to measure or specify the quality of security of a route discovered by our generalized SADSR protocol. The first technique is the explicit representation of trust levels using a simple hierarchy that reflects organizational privileges. The next subsection enumerates the different techniques used to protect the integrity of routing messages in fixedrouting protocols.
Trust Hierarchy
SADSR provides applications the ability to incorporate explicit trust levels into the route discovery process. Most organizations have an internal hierarchy of privileges. For example, in our battlefield scenario, the military ranks of the users of the ad hoc nodes form an explicit partial-ordering of privilege levels. A simple way of incorporating trust levels into ad hoc networks is to mirror the organizational hierarchy, and associate a number with each privilege level. These numbers represent the security/importance/capability of the mobile nodes and also of the paths. Simple comparison operators can sort these levels to reflect their position in the actual hierarchy. Another alternative is to use what we call the QoP bit vector. For example, if mobile nodes in a network can support four different types of message protection, we can use a four bit vector to represent these message types.
However, what is more important is that this trust level or protection should be immutable. A node with a lower trust level cannot arbitrarily change its trust level, or change the trust level of the RREQ request it forwards. To provide this guarantee, many techniques can be employed. If keys can be distributed priori, or a key agreement can be reached by some form of authentication, the simplest technique is to encrypt the portion of the RREQ and RREP headers that contain the trust level. If all the nodes in a trust level share a key, then any node that does not belong to this level cannot decrypt or process the packet, and is forced to drop it. If a node is compromised, tamper proofing can prevent attackers from learning the values of the keys. In this paper, we leverage related research in key management for ad hoc networks and assume that some mechanism to distribute keys and share secrets is already in place.
Secure Routing Metrics
We develop our notion of the "level of protection" associated with security of information in transit in routing protocol packets. Specifically, in SADSR, the aim is to protect any information or behavior that can update or cause a change to the routing tables on cooperating nodes involved in an ad hoc routing protocol. The definition of routing protocol security used here borrows from traditional security services specifications for wired routing protocols [10] . For completeness, timeliness and ordering are added to the list of desirable security properties that can eliminate or reduce the threat of attacks against routing protocols. Techniques that can be used to guarantee these properties are also described. These are shown in Table  1 .
Table1. Secure Ad Hoc Routing Properties
The following properties can be integrated into routing protocol messages to prevent attacks that exploit the vulnerability of unprotected information in transit: Timeliness: Routing updates need to be delivered in a timely fashion. Update messages that arrive late may not reflect the true state of the links or routers on the network. They can cause incorrect forwarding or even propagate false information and weaken the credibility of the update information. Most ad hoc routing protocols have timestamps and timeout mechanisms to guarantee the freshness of the routes they provide. Ordering: Out-of-order updates can also affect the correctness of the routing protocols. These messages may not reflect the true state of the network and may propagate false information. Ad hoc routing protocols have sequence numbers that are unique within the routing domain to keep updates in order. Authenticity: Routing updates must originate from authenticated nodes and users. Mutual authentication is the basis of a trust relationship. Simple passwords [11] can be used for weak authentication. Each entity can append a public key certificate, attested by a trusted third party to claim its authenticity. The certifying authority can implement a password based login or a challenge-response mechanism to authenticate the identity in the first place. The receiving node can then verify this claim by examining the certificate. One of the problems in ad hoc networking is the absence of a centralized authority to issue and validate certificates of authenticity. Authorization: An authenticated user or node is issued an unforgeable credential by the certificate authority. These credentials specify the privileges and permissions associated by the users or the nodes. Currently, credentials are not used in routing protocol packets, and any packet can trigger update propagations and modifications to the routing table. Integrity: The information carried in the routing updates can cause the routing table to change and alter the flow of packets in the network. Therefore, the integrity of the content of these messages must be guaranteed. This can be accomplished by using message digests and digital signatures [12] .
Non-repudiation:
Routers cannot repudiate ownership of routing protocol messages they send. A major concern with the updates is the trust model associated with the propagation of updates that originate from distant nodes. Ad-hoc nodes obtain information from their neighbors and forward it to their other neighbors. These neighbors may forward it to other neighbors and so on. In most existing protocols, nodes cannot vouch for the authenticity of updates that are not generated by their immediate neighbors. In order to preserve trust relationships, it becomes necessary to form a chain of routers (using signatures to protect integrity) and authenticate every one in turn, following the chain to the source. This is necessary because trust relationships are not transitive. Alternative solutions that avoid chaining include the path attribute mechanism developed for Secure BGP and secure distance vector routing [9], [10] . Confidentiality: In addition to integrity, sometimes it may be necessary to prevent intermediate or nontrusted nodes from understanding the contents of packets as they are exchanged between routers. Encrypting the routing protocol packets themselves can prevent unauthorized users from reading it. Only routers that have the decryption key can decrypt these messages and participate in the routing. This is employed when a node cannot trust one or more of its immediate neighbors to route packets correctly, etc. Each of these desirable properties has a cost and performance penalty associated with it. Some options such as enforcing access control to routing tables using credentials and providing non repudiation by chaining signatures are extremely expensive and impractical to implement and enforce in a generalized routing protocol. However, in scenarios where performance is not the driving factor, a route with quantifiable security guarantees can be more relevant than a shortest route. The purpose of this subsection was to identify the desirable properties of a secure routing protocol. SADSR uses security information to dynamically influence the choice of routes installed in the routing tables. Applications can choose to implement a subset of these protection guarantees, based on a cost-benefit analysis of various techniques available to SAR in this decision making phase. In Section 5, we describe a particular implementation of SADSR using DSR.
Protection
We develop an attack classification and itemize the protection Offered by our protocol against attacks on the trust hierarchy and the information in transit in the routing protocol messages.
Trust levels
Attacks on the trust hierarchy can be broadly classified as Outsider Attacks and Insider Attacks, based on the trust value associated with the identity or the source of the attack. SADSR modifies the behavior of route discovery, tying in protocol behavior with the trust level of a user. What is also needed is a binding between the identity of the user with the associated trust level. Without this binding, any user can impersonate anybody else and obtain the privileges associated with higher trust levels. To prevent this, stronger access control mechanisms are required. In order to force the nodes and users to respect the trust hierarchy, cryptographic techniques, e.g., encryption, public key certificates, shared secrets etc., can be employed. For example, all authenticated users belonging to a trust level can share a secret key.
Traditionally strong authentication schemes are used to combat outsider attacks. The identity of a user is certified by a centralized authority, and can be verified using a simple challenge response protocol. Various schemes including the application of threshold cryptography [2] , techniques for key sharing [13] , and techniques for key agreement between multiple cooperating entities in dynamic collaborative groups [14] have been proposed to tackle the lack of a centralized authority in an ad hoc network.
Our open design allows us to incorporate any of these mechanisms. For example, if one key is used per level, the trust levels are immutable and the trust hierarchy can be enforced. In our implementation, for simplicity, we use a simple shared secret to generate a symmetric encryption/decryption key per trust level. Packets are encrypted using this key and nodes and users be longing to different levels cannot even read the RREQ or RREP packets. Any user or node that is an outsider cannot obtain this key.
Insider attacks are launched by compromised users within a protection domain or trust level. The users may be behaving maliciously, or their identity may be compromised (key is broken etc.). Routing protocol packets in existing ad-hoc algorithms do not carry authenticated identities or authorization credentials, and compromised nodes can potentially cause a lot of damage. Insider attacks are hard to prevent in general at the protocol level. Some techniques to prevent insider attacks include secure transient associations [15] , tamper proof or tamper resistant nodes etc. For example, every time a user wants to send a RREQ, the node may require that a user re-key a password, or present her fingerprint for biometric analysis to prove her identity. If the device is lost or captured by an unauthorized user, and an attempt to send RREQs is made, this is detected by the node. The node can then destroy its keys to avoid capture (tamper proofing).
Information in Transit
In this subsection we examine specific threats to routing protocol information in transit. In addition to exploiting vulnerabilities related to the protection and enforcement of the trust levels, compromised or enemy nodes can utilize the information carried in the routing protocol packets to launch attacks. These attacks can lead to corruption of information, disclosure of sensitive information, theft of legitimate service from other protocol entities, or denial of network service to protocol entities [17] . Threats to information in transit include [16] , [17] , [18] :
Interruption: The flow of routing protocol packets, especially route discovery messages and updates can be interrupted or blocked by malicious nodes. Attackers can selectively filter control messages and updates, and force the routing protocol to behave incorrectly. In SADSR, a malicious node that interrupts the flow of packets belonging to a higher or lower trust level cannot cause an attack, because it is supposed to drop these packets in any case. If a node filters packets that belong to the same trust level as itself, the broadcast nature of the communication channel can help in detection of interruption attacks by other listeners within transmission range [19] .
Interception and Subversion: Routing protocol traffic and control messages, e.g., the "keep-alive" and "are-you-up?" messages can be detected, rerouted. In SADSR, the messages are protected by the key management infrastructure. In addition, the use of flooding makes these attacks superfluous.
Modification: The integrity of the information in routing protocol packets can be compromised by modifying the packets themselves. False routes can be propagated, and legitimate nodes can be bypassed. SADSR provides a suite of cryptographic techniques that can be incorporated on a need-to-use basis to prevent modification. These include digital signatures and encryption.
Fabrication: False route and metric information can be inserted into legitimate protocol packets by malicious insider nodes. In such a situation, the sender of the RREQ may receive multiple RREPs. Currently SADSR picks the first RREP that arrives at the sender. The sender can be modified to verify that the RREP has credentials that guarantee the integrity of the metrics, and repudiate the ownership of attributes by challenging the intermediate nodes. We plan to incorporate this behavior in the future.
Implementation
In this section, we describe an implementation of SADSR, built as an augmentation to the DSR protocol in the GloMoSim [20] network simulator. We retain most of DSR's original behavior. We modify the RREQ and the RREP packet formats to carry additional security information. We call our modified DSR protocol, SADSR (Security-aware DSR). In SADSR, RREQ packets have an additional field called RQ-SEC-REQUIREMENT that indicates the required security for the route the sender wishes to discover. This field is only set once by the sender and does not change during the route discovery phase. When an intermediate node receives a RREQ packet, the protocol first checks if the node can satisfy the security requirement indicated in the packet. If the node is secure/ capable enough to participate in the routing, SADSR behaves like DSR and the RREQ packet is forwarded to its neighbors. If the intermediate node cannot satisfy the security requirement, the RREQ packet is dropped and not forwarded. When an intermediate node decides to forward the request, a new field in the RREQ packet is updated. RQ-SEC-GUARANTEE indicates the maximum level of security afforded by the paths discovered. This approach opens the question of the effect of malicious nodes in networks. Since it is not uncommon to assume some mobile nodes will either be captured or compromised during the operation [2] , SADSR must provide a way to guarantee the cooperation of nodes. This cooperation is achieved by encrypting the RREQ headers, or by adding digital signatures and distributing keys to nodes that belong to the same level in the trust hierarchy that can decrypt these headers and re-encrypt them when necessary.
The arrival of a RREQ packet at the destination indicates the presence of a path from the sender to the receiver that satisfies the security requirement specified by the sender. The destination node sends the RREP packet as in DSR, but with additional information indicating the maximum security available over the path. The value of the RQ-SEC-GUARANTEE field in the RREQ packet is copied to RP-SEC-GUARANTEE field in the RREP packet. When the RREP packet arrives at an intermediate node in the reverse path, intermediate nodes that are allowed to participate, update their routing tables as in DSR and also record the new RP-SEC-GUARANTEE value. This value indicates the maximum security available on the cached forward path. When a trusted intermediate node answers a RREQ query using cached information, this value is compared to the security requirement in the RREQ packet. Only when the forward path can guarantee enough security is the cached path information sent back in the RREP. In addition, SADSR also has support for digital signatures. If the application requested integrity support, a new field to store the computed digital signatures was added to the RREQ.
Performance Evaluation
This section presents a representative sample of the simulation results collected using our SADSR implementation in GloMoSim network simulator. The simulation was run for different security attributes, packet formats, traffic patterns, and trust hierarchies. Across our experiments, we observe that compared to DSR, SADSR sends fewer routing protocol control messages for the same number of flows and the same amount of application data. As a result, though the overhead per control message is higher in SADSR, the performance impact is sustainable.
Simulation Set-up
The results presented in this section are based on the simulation set up for 50 nodes moving around in 670m by 670m region. Nodes move according to the random way-point model described in [21] . The 50 nodes are classified into three levels (high, medium and low), each with 15, 15, and 20 nodes respectively. When a node sends out the RREQ, it uses its own security level as the security requirement for the route. In all measurements, the same amount of data (about 10000 packets) is sent, using the same number of flows (20) , and sending at the same rate. The simulation is run until all flows complete sending. Two different traffic patterns are used to drive the simulations. Traffic pattern 1 consists of 20 CBR flows. 10% of the flows are between the high level nodes, 20% between the medium and 70% between the low level nodes. Traffic pattern 2 also has 20 CBR flows, but the distribution is 33%, 33%, 34% for the high, medium, and low level nodes. The packet size is 512 bytes, and the sending rate is 4 packets/ second. The maximum number of packets in each flow is 500.
SADSR Processing Overheads
The original DSR protocol is used as a benchmark to study the pure processing overheads of SADSR. The behavior of SADSR and DSR cannot be compared directly, since SADSR has larger RREQ and RREP packets compared to DSR and all the nodes participating in the route discovery must do additional processing. Initially, SADSR is configured to do trust enforcement processing, but not drop RREQ packets when required. Compared to DSR, SADSR takes 1% and 3% longer to finish with traffic patterns 1 and 2. This demonstrates that the pure overhead of adding additional processing to enable security, in the absence of dropping, is not prohibitive. We use this SADSR without RREQ dropping, SADSR-D, as our baseline for rest of the performance measurements.
Path Discovery
Next, we ran SADSR-D and SADSR with explicit trust values, on the same traffic patterns to observe the difference in protocol behavior. The number of paths discovered by SADSR-D and SADSR, and the number of paths that violate the security requirement in SADSR-D were recorded. Since SADSR-D behaves like original DSR, some of the paths found violated the security requirement. This is summarized in Table 2 . Though SADSR-D found more paths when the trust levels were enforced, 16 and 21 of these paths respectively were unusable. SADSR discovered fewer paths, but these paths are guaranteed to obey the trust requirements of their senders. Table 3 shows the numbers of routing protocol messages in SADSR-D and SADSR. We observe that there is a drop in the number of RREQ messages sent in SADSR. This is because the RREQ is dropped and not forwarded when the intermediate nodes cannot handle the security requirement of the RREQ packets. These results imply that SADSR generates fewer routing messages, while enabling applications to find more relevant routes. In the case of Pattern 1, there was a decrease of 4% in RREQ messages and 26% in RREP messages. For Pattern 2, the results were more accentuated (43% in RREQs, and 40% in RREPs). This is due to the fact that the trust hierarchy is more equitably distributed in Pattern 2 and paths tend to be smaller. SADSR security restrictions may force packets to follow longer, but more secure paths and result in taking more time to finish communication. The overhead of the protocol is illustrated in Table 4 , which shows the overall time to complete transmission of all the traffic flows in both SADSR with RREQ dropping and SADSR-D, and the total amount of data transmitted. With RREQ dropping, SADSR takes 2.7% and 0.3% more time to finish in traffic patterns 1 and 2 compared to SADSR-D. Although SADSR takes marginally more time to finish communication, it still finds paths in most cases and delivers almost the same amount of data from senders to the receivers
Table2. Number of Paths and Security Violation

Table3. Routing Messages Overhead
Table4. Overall Simulation Time and Transmitted Data
Secure Routing Measurements
The SADSR protocol is augmented with hash digests and symmetric encryption mechanisms. The signed hash digests provide message integrity, whereas encrypting packets guarantees their confidentiality. Nodes that have the same trust level share the same encryption and decryption keys. The MD5 Hash algorithm and the Blowfish block cipher were used for these measurements. We present the measurements for Traffic Pattern 1 only, due to space constraints. The results for Pattern 2 show a similar trend. The entire RREQ packet was encrypted, with the exception of the packet-type field. The SADSR-D protocol reflects the overhead of adding the extra field in the header. In Table 5 , we observe that SADSR-E (SADSR with Encryption) and SADSR-S (SADSR with Signed Hash) sent fewer RREQs and RREPs than SADSR-D. This is because nodes that were not capable of decrypting the encrypted RREQ packets, or could not verify the signatures, dropped these packets without forwarding. This reinforces our claim that SADSR sends fewer control messages (RREQs and RREPs) than SADSR-D, though each packet needs more processing.
Conclusion
SADSR enables the discovery of secure routes in a mobile ad hoc environment. Its integrated security metrics allow applications to explicitly capture and enforce explicit cooperative trust relationship. SADSR also provides customizable security to the flow of routing protocol messages themselves. Routes discovered by SADSR come with "quality of protection" guarantees. The techniques enabled by SADSR can be easily incorporated into generic ad hoc routing protocols as illustrated by our implementation example -SADSR. The processing overheads in SADSR are offset by restricting the cope of the flooding for more relevant routes, providing comparable price/performance benefits.
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